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COMMENTS
FROM MATTRESS AND CASHBOX TO
SPECULATIVE SECURITIES: THE INVESTOR AND
HIS MUTUAL FUND
by Raymond L. Dahlberg
The mutual fund, a distinct member of the elite class of "institutional
investor,"' has, in the last thirty years, propagated itself headlong into an
economic age which has notably been termed the "paraproprietal" society.!
The past three decades have witnessed a 450 million dollar business develop
into a 52 billion dollar industry.' One half of this increase has been attrib-
uted to an appreciation in market value, and the balance has resulted from
the sale of new shares.4 This phenomenal growth in investors can probably
best be imputed to two major factors: (1) The concept of diversification
of risk, and (2) the advent of "professional management" claimed to be
highly proficient in investment techniques.' Both of these money-making
maxims would remain inaccessible to virtually every small investor were
it not for the mutual fund.! However, the mounting interest in this growth
1 Institutional investors include banks, pension funds, insurance companies, savings and loan
associations, college and university endowment funds, foundations, and investment companies (in-
cluding mutual funds). D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS 29 (1965). The four fac-
tors characteristic of an institutional investor are: (1) concentration of large holdings in a rela-
tively small number of hands, (2) full-time professionalism, (3) holdings of large blocks of stock
issues, and (4) fiduciary responsibility. DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CONFERENCE ON
SECuRrriEs REGULATION 136-37 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE].
S"Paraproprietal" is the neologism developed to describe the twentieth century system of
American property ownership which has resulted from the institutional investor being interposi-
tioned between the corporation and the public investor. In this sense the system is said to be
"beyond property." P. HARBRECHT, S.J. & A. BERLE, JR., TOWARD THE PARAPROPRIETAL SOCIETY
8 (1960).
'Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 125 (1967). Another source puts the net assets of mutual funds in 1941 at $401
million. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 95 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. The $52 billion asset value
is as of Dec. 31, 1969. INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Mar. 24, 1970, pt. II (Mutual Fund Direc-
tory), at 176. Mutual funds are not the only institutional investor that has experienced such
growth. Corporate pension funds are well out in front of the rest of the pack, having a percentage
growth between 1954 and 1968 of exactly twice that of mutual funds. 115 CONG. REC. E1327
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1969).
4
SPECIAL STUDY pt. 3, at 95.
' Diversification is a guiding principle in the mutual fund business, and that principle is fostered
by the statutory provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 whch regulates the mutual
fund industry and other investment companies. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8(b), 13(a), 80a (1964). The investor's desire for portfolio
diversification was found to be the second most important incentive prompting investment in mu-
tual fund shares. SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 141. As for professional management, a leading scholarly
authority in the mutual fund area, Robert H. Mundheim, has stated: "The public investor who
decides to invest in the equity market through an institution-be it an investment company,
or insurance company or a bank-does so, in part, because he believes that the institution provides
expert management. He is willing to pay something in order to be relieved of the responsibility
of making individual investment decisions." CONFERENCE 132. Professional management was found
to be the most important factor that caused investors to select mutual funds. SPECIAL STUDY pt.
4, at 285. See also Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 188 (1967). Diversification and professional management are the two
most important ingredients of the growing "salesmanship" aspect of the mutual funds. See SPECIAL
STUDY pt. 4, at 293.
' Leon T. Kendall, an economist for the New York Stock Exchange and a panel member on
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has by no means manifested itself solely in the enthusiasm of the American
investing public.' In recent years the most active issue both judicially and
politically has been the mutual fund management fee.' But the inquisition
has not neglected other areas of importance.' This monumental concern,
touching virtually all phases of the industry, has centered primarily upon
the inadequacy of the regulatory framework within which mutual funds
operate. That framework has not been materially altered since its enactment
almost thirty years ago,"0 and this statutory stagnancy, plus the concern
for growth, has generated a host of problems which, under the current
regulatory scheme, are assertedly incapable of adequate solution."1
a 1965 securities conference, rather elaborately summarized the growing sophistication of the
American investor.
The easiest way to look at this is to try to develop in your mind's eye a hierarchy
of zones of financial sophistication. At the bottom of the ladder you start with some-
thing like the mattress or cashbox, then U.S. Savings bonds, then commercial bank
savings accounts or mutual bank savings accounts. Here draw a fundamental line
which has to be crossed requiring greater sophistication. Then start up again to sav-
ings and loan accounts, credit union accounts and balanced mutual fund holdings.
The next line to be crossed . . . brings us to the zone of high sophistication. Here
you find blue chip stocks, growth stock oriented mutual funds, speculative stocks,
real estate and direct business investments, and the buying and selling of corpora-
tions. The American people are moving up this ladder. This explains why people have
moved into savings and loans and mutual fund investments. . . . I agree with . . .
[another panel member] that investors should not jump from mattress and cashbox
to speculative securities, but, on the other hand, the mutual fund investor is a likely
prospect for direct stock investment and the blue chip stock investor may well move
up to speculative stocks.
CONFERENCE 165-66.
'In 1966, in a report to Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission stated its position
that "the Investment Company Act of 1940 has substantially eliminated the serious abuses at
which it was aimed, but the tremendous growth of the industry and the accompanying changes
have created a need for additional protection for mutual fund shareholders in areas which were
either unanticipated or of secondary importance in 1940." SEC, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
letter of transmittal, vii (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIc POLICY STATEMENT].
'For a recent, thorough analysis dealing with the problem of mutual fund management fees,
see The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 894-956 (1969).
In addition, see Gopman, The Management Fee Problem and the Investment Company Act of
1940, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 153 (1969); Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anomaly, 14
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1252 (1967); University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual
Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 726-67 (1967); Wymeersch, Some Aspects of Management Fees of
Mutual Funds, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 747 (1968); Comment, Securities Regulation-Management
Fees, Conspiracy or Compensation, 36 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 348 (1968).
"See The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732 (1969), which
discusses such problems as mutual fund selling practices, sales loads, and the influx of insurance
companies and banks into the mutual fund arena. In addition, see Mundheim, Some Thoughts on
the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
1058 (1967); Werner, Protecting the Mutual Fund Investor: The SEC Reports on the SEC, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1968) (critical analysis of the 1966 PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT and the role
of the SEC in protecting the mutual fund investor); Comment, Rights and Obligations in the
Mutual Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1120 (1967) (the source of law to be applied
in the development of a federal common law regulating mutual funds); Note, The Regulation of
Dual Funds, 54 VA. L. REV. 1396 (1968) (development of the American dual fund under the
influence of the SEC). In addition, three studies of the mutual fund industry have been con-
ducted since 1958. WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (this study investigated the per-
formance and market impact of mutual funds and analyzed the relationship between the funds
and their investment advisors and principal underwriters); SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, ch. XI (examined
primarily aspects of the sale of mutual fund shares); PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT (investigated the
management advisory system, portfolio transactions, the sale of mutual fund shares, investment
performance, and the impact of the growth of mutual funds on the securities markets).
"0PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT 1; North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company
Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677, 685 (1969).
" This appears to be the conclusion of the authors of an extensive analysis of the industry.
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The past two years have contributed significantly to the augmenting
legal meshes of an industry already beseiged by a body of authorities intent
on expanding judicial or legislative regulation. The dimensions of the
existing problems were substantially widened in 1969 as the securities
market exacted from mutual funds its retribution for several years of
financial bliss and prosperity.2 Though the losses themselves are detrimental
to mutual funds, their repercussions may go far beyond a drop in new
sales or an increase in share redemptions. The legal implications could be
devastating to the industry and its professional management, for, prior to
the '69 crash, the accusing finger of "speculation" had in several instances
been directed at mutual funds.a This Comment will explore the investor-
The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 967 (1969). See also
Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsi-
bility under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 181, 267 (1966); note
7 supra. In 1941 at least one commentator had grave doubts that the Investment Company Act
of 1940 would adequately curtail the industry abuses which prompted its enactment. Thomas,
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 918, 945-46 (1941).
1"Many financial reports recorded the fall of the funds during 1969. Of special interest, see
Glenn, Most Funds Post Losses But Still Beat the Dow, Barron's, Nov. 3, 1969, at 31, col. 2;
Funds Cautious as DIIA Eluded "1,000," Commercial & Financial Chronicle [hereinafter abbre-
viated to Com. & Fin. Chr.], Feb. 20, 1969, at 797, col. 1; Glenn, Some Swingers Found the
Going Rough Last Year, Barron's, Feb. 3, 1969, at 27, col. 2.
One mutual fund which registered a 116% increase in its net asset value in 1967 sustained a
36% shrinkage after seven months of the 1969 market. See statistics for the O'Neil Fund in
Performance Funds: Under a Cloud, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1969, at 80. Other declines, though not so
drastic, are legion as 1969 "performance" was measured in terms of a fund's ability to keep its
losses below those of its mutual competitors. Glenn, Some Swingers Found the Going Rough Last
Year, Barron's, Feb. 3, 1969, at 27, col. 2.
sa The catchword over the last few years has been "performance," not only emphasized by
mutual fund management, but by investors themselves. One of the findings of the SPECIAL STUDY
was "the high investor expectations regarding the prospective performance of both the stock
market in general and of mutual funds relative to the market." SPECIAL STUDY pt. 4, at 320-21.
This increasing awareness of mutual fund performance by investors demonstrates forcefully the
industry's own infatuation with the concept. The great prominence given to performance can be
ascribed to the funds' competitive desires to outperform each other and all other areas of the se-
curities market. Owens, Mutual Funds and the "Letter Stock" Problem, Com. & Fin. Chr., July 31,
1969, at 22, col. 1; Biel, Investment Problems and Prospects, Coin. & Fin. Chr., June 12, 1969,
at 1, col. 1; What Price Performance?, BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 1968, at 32. The re-
wards for achieving superior performance represent an increasing accumulation of the public's
investment dollar, as investors gravitate toward those funds that answer their demands for a
maximization of total return. In the words of a vice-president of one small mutual fund: "Per-
formance, then, is an integral part of our business. It is basic to our existence, our continuing
growth and our ultimate survival." University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual
Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 690 (1967) (statement of Robert W. Doran, vice-president of
Ivest Fund) ; see The Sixties: Performance is no Longer a Dirty Word, FORBES, Jan. 1, 1970, at 223.
At the First Annual Institutional Investors Conference in 1968 Manuel Cohen, then Chairman
of the SEC, equated performance with speculation and seriously questioned if the American invest-
ing public was willing to substitute conservative investing with the newfangled performance con-
cept involving high risk approaches. What Price Performance?, BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE,
Mar. 1968, at 32. At the same conference David L. Babson, president of an investment advisory
firm and director of a mutual fund, noted that a heavy concentration of assets and a high port-
folio turnover was "at best, trading performance and at worst, outright gambling with other peo-
ple's money," and he concluded that the securities markets were being converted into a "gigantic
crap game." Id. More recently, a representative of the SEC labeled the emphasis on performance
"great and unprecedented," and expressed personal misgivings concerning the "speculative activity
of some of the funds in order to meet their performance objective." Owens, Mutual Funds and
the "Letter Stock" Problem, Coin. & Fin. Chr., July 31, 1969, at 22, col. 1. For the most part
these accusations have been leveled at the "go-go" funds, which consist primarily of the growth-
oriented stock funds. Id.; Funds that Subtract Safety To Add Growth, BUSINESS MANAGEMENT,
July 1969, at 37; Biel, Investment Problems and Prospects, Coin. & Fin. Chr., June 12, 1969, at 1,
col. 1; Sober Appraisal-Every Speculative Binge, says Ralph Rotnem, Brings a Morning After,
Barron's, Mar. 31, 1969, at 3, col. 1; Shapiro, Trading in Tulips, Barron's, Aug. 26, 1968, at 1,
col. 1; Babson, Performance--The Latest Name for Speculation?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct.,
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protections afforded by federal regulation of the investment company
complex under circumstances in which professional money-managers of
open-end mutual funds are engaging in "speculation"' 4 without the knowl-
edge or consent of investors.
I. STATUTORY DISCLOSURE OF INVESTMENT POLICIES
The Investment Company Act of 1940"' was the congressional house-
cleaning of an industry that had been plagued by gross mismanagement
and spectacular failures generated primarily by its own servants. 0 For the
protection of the investor, the statutory provisions employed the concept
of disclosure as a potent administrative weapon to curtail certain abuses.'
Thus, the Act requires each investment company to set out in its registra-
tion statement the classification and subclassification within which the
registrant proposes to operate;"S and, in addition, to declare its policy as to
borrowing money, issuing senior securities, underwriting securities, invest-
ing in real estate or commodities, concentrating investments in a particular
industry or group of industries, making loans, and portfolio turnover.
The registrant must adhere to these policies unless a change is authorized
by a majority vote of the outstanding voting securities." More important,
however, is the requirement that the registration statement contain "a
1967, at 129; Relative Performance-Nonsense, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug., 1966, at 101. For
an "inside" look at the performance cult, see A. SMITH, THE MONEY GAME 177 (1969).
Of course, the industry has defended the performance mania. One professional money-manager
has stated: "There is widespread acceptance of the objective of 'appreciation' or 'maximizing total
return' as opposed to 'avoiding risk' or simply 'maintaining principal.' Performance investing has
some real durability and is not just a blib [sic] rationalization for speculation." Stern, Dilemma
Facing the Investment Manager, Com. & Fin. Chr., Aug. 7, 1969, at 1, col. 1. See FORBES, Sept. 1,
1969, at 56.
" "Speculation" is an extremely elusive concept and not susceptible to an easy definition. In
the classic case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830), the Massachusetts
court freed the American fiduciary from the ancient Victorian shackles of ultra-conservatism im-
posed upon him by his English brethren. In so doing, the court concluded that there existed no
truly safe investments, because no matter how capital was employed, there was risk. This con-
clusion ultimately suggests that every investment is speculative. It seems that a definition of specu-
lation must vary with time and circumstances. However, for purposes of this Comment, a definition
in terms of risk seems appropriate.
15 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the 1940 Act,
or the Act, and in footnotes cited to sections of that Act only].
" Examples of the abuses are to be found in Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940,
26 CORNELL L.Q. 77 (1940); Comment, The Regulation of Management Investment Trusts for the
Protection of Investors, 46 YALE L.J. 1211 (1937); Note, Statutory Regulation of Investment
Trusts, 44 HARV. L. REV. 117 (1930); Note, Regulation of Investment Companies, 88 U. PA.
L. REv. 584 (1940). In addition, specific abuses which existed in the industry prior to the 1940
Act are documented throughout the SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES, which was submitted to Congress in various parts over a three-year period. Chapter
VII of part III of the Report, which deals with abuses in the organization and operation of in-
vestment trusts and companies, was printed in H.R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
See also H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 2 (1940).
17 See Motley, Federal Regulation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1134, 1140 (1950); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 285-88
(1941).
" Under § 4 of the Act, registered investment companies are divided into three classes: face-
amount certificate companies, unit investment trusts, and management investment companies.
Furthermore, under § 5, management investment companies are classified as (a) open- or closed-
end companies, and (b) diversified or non-diversified companies.
"
9 Section 8(b)(1).
20 Section 13 (a).
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recital of the policy of the registrant in respect of matters, not enumerated
in section 8 (b) (1), which the registrant deems matters of fundamental
policy and elects to treat as such."'" This "fundamental policy" provision
is similarly subject to the majority stockholder vote requirement to effec-
tuate a change," and at first glance it may appear to offer some redress for
an aggrieved investor who has witnessed the diminution of his fortune in
the hands of a mutual fund management bent on speculation. Unfortu-
nately, one judicial decision and some legislative history suggest otherwise.
Judicial Activity. In Green v. Brown," the only case thus far decided
under section 13 of the Act, a stockholder brought a derivative action
against the directors of a closed-end, non-diversified investment company
for changing a "fundamental policy" of the company without stockholder
approval. The instruction forms which the SEC had sent to Narragansett
Capital Corporation for preparation of its registration statement provided
that the section of such statement entitled "Item 2. Fundamental Policies
of the Registrant" was to contain the policies that the company deemed
fundamental and elected to treat as such under section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
The instructions also specified that under Item 3 of the same section the
registrant was to specify certain investment policies which were not de-
scribed as "fundamental" under Item 2. Therefore, under Item 3 in its
registration statement, the company listed several investment policies which
could not be changed without the majority approval of the stockholders.
One of these policies provided that the company would at no time invest
more than twenty per cent of its combined capital and surplus in the
securities of any one issuer, except those of the United States Government.
The company did so invest, and a stockholder alleged a violation of section
13 (a) (3).2
The court noted that section 13 (a) (3) of the Act only prohibited de-
21 Section 8 (b) (2).
22 Section 13 (a) (3).
23276 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1968).
24 The defendant directors contended, and the court found, that the stockholders had subse-
quently ratified the investments which purportedly violated the company's "fundamental investment
policy" concerning the twenty per cent limitation. In this respect, it is interesting to note that
a proxy statement sent to the stockholders for the purpose of approving a change in the twenty
per cent limitation policy for the future, referred to the limitation as a "fundamental investment
policy" of the company. Id. at 756 n.3. It appears the stockholder here was contending that the
deviation from the twenty per cent limitation was a violation of § 13 (a) (3) because that limitation
appeared in the company's prospectus as a "fundamental policy." The stockholder's authority for
this proposition was Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (Ch. 1961), where a Delaware
court held that a change in the company's investment policy of "normal turnover," as stated in
its prospectus, was a violation of the Act. The court in Green refuted this by stating that "under
the Act, the only relevant policies are those contained in the registration statement. The prospectus
is immaterial." 276 F. Supp. at 756 n.4. It is quite clear that under § 13 (a) of the Act a violation
does not occur unless the company deviates from the recitals of policy contained in its registration
statement. The nexus between these two items of disclosure is the SEC. Under § 45(a) of the
Act, the information in the registration statement "shall be made available to the public, unless
and except in so far as the Commission, by rules and regulations . . . finds that public disclosure
is neither necessary nor appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Of
course, a mutual fund prospectus must be delivered to the potential investor when or before the
shares are sold. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(10), 77(e), & 77(j) (1965). Not-
withstanding this requirement, some prospective investors never see the prospectus. SPECIAL STUDY
pt. 4, at 339.
1970]
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viations from "fundamental policies" elected to be treated as such under
section 8 (b) (2), and that Narragansett did not treat its twenty per cent
limitation as a "fundamental policy" under that section, even though the
registration statement required majority stockholder approval for a change
of that policy. The court concluded that Narragansett had not violated the
Act by deviating from the stated twenty per cent limitation, although the
court observed that "[o]ne would think that no policy could be more
'fundamental' in an investment company than its policy pertaining to
investments."' Nevertheless, section 13 (a) (3) was held to apply only to
those policies which the registrant "elected" to "deem" fundamental, and
the court refused to ignore the statutory words completely and thereby
find what it believed to be the more favorable result. The only alternative
offered was that "[i]f it be thought undesirable to permit an investment
company to 'write its own ticket,' so to speak .. . the remedy lies with
Congress, not with the courts."2 The statutory construction of the lan-
guage of sections 13 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act by this federal dis-
trict court seems difficult to refute. However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, as it remanded the case on appeal, implied
that the difficulty might be a minor one."
Prior to the filing of the appeal, an aspect of the case had changed,
possibly rendering the action moot; the stockholder himself asserted a
violation of the Act which the district court had not considered; and the
Securities and Exchange Commission participated as amicus and suggested
a possible defense of good faith reliance on commission forms. "' Thus, the
Second Circuit felt constrained to remand the case to allow the district
court to consider the new issues and have the benefit of the Commission's
viewpoint. However, in its opinion, the court intimates disapproval of the
lower court's interpretation of sections 13 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2). In justi-
fying consideration of an issue first raised on appeal, the court of appeals
felt the issues concerned in the case "are of great significance in construing
an act designed to protect thousands of investors."'" The court then gave
the Commission's argument that "Congress intended the term 'fundamen-
tal,' as used in sections 8 (b) (2) and 13 (a) (3), to apply to any investment
policy which a registrant 'elects' to make subject to shareholder approval."3
Thereafter, the court states, "[t]he district court has construed two sec-
tions of the Act in a way that is at least questionable, without the benefit
of the Commission's views."'" Following the decision in Green v. Brown by
the Second Circuit, the SEC proposed a revision in its forms so that any
investment policy which a registrant decides shall not be changed without
25276 F. Supp. at 756.
26 Id.
27 Green v. Brown, 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1968).
28 Section 38(c) of the Act provides: "No provision of this title imposing any liability shall
apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or order
of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule, regulation, or order may . . . be determined
by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason."





shareholder approval shall be considered a "fundamental" policy within
the meaning of sections 8 (b) (2) and 13 (a) (3). Even if it be conceded
that the Commission has some authority to define what "fundamental"
means,"3 it is doubtful that the Second Circuit's opinion in Green, or the
Commission's proposed revision, does anything to substantially protect the
investor. Rather, it simply forces the investment company to pour its
management investment policies into a new container. A company will
continue to possess the ability to "write its own ticket" as it avoids electing
to treat certain policies as "fundamental" by refusing to make them subject
to change solely by approval of the majority of the shareholders.
The unfavorable treatment of the district court's interpretation of
sections 8 (b) (2) and 13 (a) (3) in Green, plus the Commission's willing-
ness to use its regulatory powers to further protections for the investing
public, point in the direction of a broader interpretation of section
8 (b) (2), with an accompanying constriction of the registrant's power to
perform its "ticket writing" under the protective wing of the statutory
language. Such an expansion, though highly desirable, is completely unwar-
ranted. If the strong language of section 8 (b) (2) does not clearly show
congressional intent to give an investment company the right to "elect"
whether or not a certain policy will be conclusively presumed to be "funda-
mental," then perhaps the legislative history will elucidate that intent.
Legislative History. Courts have properly encountered little difficulty in
expanding the provisions of the Act because of the declaration of policy
in section 1. "It is hereby declared that the policy and purposes of this
title, in accordance with which the provisions of this title shall be inter-
preted, are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions
enumerated in this section which adversely affect the national public in-
terest and the interest of investors."' And one of the conditions specifically
enumerated concerns investors who deal in securities of an investment com-
pany "without adequate, accurate, and explicit information, fairly pre-
sented, concerning the character of such securities and the circumstances,
policies, and financial responsibility of such companies and their manage-
32SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 4939 (Dec. 20, 1968).
33 Under § 8 (a) the Commission has the authority to designate what information shall be con-
tained in the registration statement "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." However, such prescriptive authority is limited in scope to encompass only
that information relating to a recital of the registrant's policies as listed under § 8(b) (1), and
a recital of fundamental policies under § 8(b) (2). Hence, the Commission could require less in-
formation than is listed in these two sections, but not more, because its discretion is bounded by
"such of the following information and documents set forth under [§§ 8(b) (1), (2), (3), and
(4)]." Section 8 (b). In addition, the Commission has the authority to define "accounting, techni-
cal, and trade terms, used in the Act." Section 38(a). However, a "fundamental policy" can not
be considered an accounting, technical, or trade term. Even if it be conceded that the SEC can
properly determine what is or is not a "fundamental policy," the election to treat that policy as
such is expressly given to the registrant under § 8(b) (2).
'The language of this section has been used as an important guideline in interpreting the Act
by both the district court and the court of appeals in Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (Ist
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
1970]
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ment."' Thus, by combining these policy statements, a favorable argument
can be made for expanding the scope of section 8 (b) (2). However, such
an argument fails to consider the particular section and its relationship to
the history surrounding the entire Act, and the atmosphere that accom-
panied the congressional action.'
The original bill dealing with the regulation of investment companies
was introduced in both Houses of Congress on March 14, 1940." ' Accord-
ing to one of the representatives of the industry at the House and Senate
hearings, "[t]he original bill followed in many respects the pattern of
recent federal legislation. . . . That there were precedents or analogies in
other federal legislation for provisions of the bill which were objectionable
to members of the industry, constituted but cold comfort for investment
company executives. While most recognized that some measure of regula-
tion was necessary for the protection of investors and was essentially to the
best interests of the industry, or was in any event inevitable, the bill as
originally introduced could not be accepted.""9 The ultimate result was that
the Commission and the industry, in a joint effort, redrafted the bill upon
principles of regulation which could be accepted by the industry.39 The
redrafted bill became the 1940 Act.
Much has been made of the spirit of "co-operativeness" which accom-
panied the enactment of the redrafted legislation.' The unanimity between
the Commission and the industry has been used by some as reason to adopt
a restrictive interpretation of the Act.4 In turn, the rebuttal has been pre-
mised on the theory that the Act represents simply an extension of the
regulatory concepts underlying the 1933 and 1934 federal securities laws,
and hence the 1940 legislation should be given a liberal construction in
" Section 1(b) (1). Other conditions include: the operation of investment companies solely
for a special class of security holders, § 1 (b) (2); inequitable provisions in securities, § 1 (b) (3);
pyramiding of investment companies and their operaton by irresponsible persons, § 1 (b) (4); the
use of misleading accounting practices, § 1(b) (5); reorganization or transfer of control without
the consent of the shareholders, § I(b) (6) ; the speculative character of junior securities, §
1 (b) (7); and when a company operates without adequate assets or reserves, § 1 (b) (8).
" Articles dealing with a history of the Act include, Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act
of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941); North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company
Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677 (1969); Thomas, The Investment Company Act of 1940,
9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 918 (1941). See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
a"Wagner-Lea Bill, S. 3580, H.R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
" Jaretzki, supra note 36, at 308-09.
laid. at 308-11. See also S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
"°Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., who represented the closed-end investment companies at the congres-
sional hearings, commented: "The passage of such comprehensive legislation with virtually no de-
bate is probably without precedent. The constructive attitude of the industry and the wholehearted
cooperation between the Commission and the industry was indeed a significant event." Jaretzki,
supra note 36, at 311 [footnotes omitted]. Senator Downey, a member of the Subcommittee on
Securities and Exchange of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, in response to learning
of the actual agreement between the Commission and the representatives of the industry on the
redrafted bill, remarked: "[T]hat is a most amazing thing in this chaotic world right now," and
thereafter he queried: "How was this miracle brought about?" Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 1130
(1940), as cited in North, note 36 supra, at 684. See also Note, The Investment Company Act
of 1940, 41 COLuM. L. REv. 269, 295 (1941); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50
YALE L.J. 440, 442 (1941).
"'Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), was influenced by the "com-
promise" legislation in holding the Act did not confer a private right of action. Id. at 912. For
a rebuttal, see Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 240, 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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order to accomplish its purpose of protecting the public investor." Indeed,
one commentator has recently suggested that the latter approach has
ultimately found success in the federal courts." Whatever the merits of
each side of this controversy, the Commission secured the much needed
regulation, and the industry succeeded in watering down substantially the
regulatory provisions of the original Wagner-Lea proposal--especially
those provisions of section 8 which contain some of the important regis-
tration requirements.
The original bill, in keeping with the "pattern of recent federal legisla-
tion," required much more information from the registrant than does the
present Act, including the characteristics and relative amounts of securities
which the registrant had acquired or intended to acquire. In addition, it
gave the SEC the power to require additional information from the regis-
trant. But most important, it provided that the Commission was to deter-
mine what was or was not a "fundamental policy."44 Clearly, the present
Act gives that election to the investment company. The following passage,
written shortly after the Act was adopted, demonstrates succinctly the
SEC's regulatory powers under both the original proposal and the Act.
While it was never seriously proposed to outlaw investment companies
entirely, the original bill . . . surpassed even the Holding Company Act in
grants of discretionary power to the Commission. Whether it would have been
politically possible to pass the bill in its original form is questionable. At any
rate, the present Act is a drastic modification, rewritten entirely by the
Commission and the industry .... Where the original draft left the Commis-
sion with power by rule and regulation to implement the broad policies of
the bill, the present Act generally sets certain maxima of regulation, leaving
in the Commission a discretionary power only to exempt and minimize.4'
The alterations performed on the original proposals of section 8 demon-
strate clearly the intent and policy to circumscribe the authority of the
Commission to require information. The use of the terms "elect" and
"deem," combined with this limited discretionary power to "exempt and
minimize" rather forcefully confirm the district court's conclusion in
Green v. Brown that the language of section 8 (b) (2), "permits, even
invites, the registrant, to withhold the fatal label 'fundamental' from any
policy, no matter how important it may be."
The statutory language of section 8 (b) (2) and the legislative intent in
modifying that section can be considered highly unfortunate. But the
" See North, supra note 36, at 684; note 39 supra.
4 North, supra note 36, at 684 n.17.
"Wagner-Lea Bill, S. 3580, H.R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. S 8 (1940). For a discussion of
the original bill see Thomas, supra note 36, at 927-28. The original bill was objected to because
of the large amount of discretionary power given to the SEC. "In general, the industry objected to
restrictive or regulatory legislation in respect to matters which were not peculiar to investment
companies. In the bill as originally introduced a very large measure of discretion was vested in
the Securities and Exchange Commission to formulate standards, to impose restrictions, and to
regulate conduct." Jaretzki, supra note 36, at 311.
'Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440, 442-43 (1941) (emphasis
added).
40276 F. Supp. 753, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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public protection policy underlying the very foundations of the Act does
not seem of sufficient import to warrant the protection of the investor by
the judiciary in a manner which Congress expressly refused to sanction.
As far as section 8 of the Act is concerned, an investor remains at the
mercy of a mutual fund's discretion. His federal remedies for a deviation
from an investment policy that is not christened "fundamental" appear
virtually non-existent.47
While section 8 offers little aid to the mutual fund investor who holds
speculative securities indirectly through a "growth" fund, section 36 of the
Act, which establishes management's liability for "gross misconduct" and
"gross abuse of trust, '48 proffers a more hopeful avenue of redress. How-
ever, before encountering the perplexities of section 36, one nagging prob-
lem demands resolution. The manner in which the courts have handled
the outburst of litigation in recent years concerning the advisory fee con-
tracts has prompted one commentator to attack the rationale underlying
the directors' liability in section 3 6."' The attack is premised on the asserted
theory that the terms of the trust define the duty to be discharged. In other
words, for the mutual fund investor the terms of the prospectus directly
designate and thereby limit the responsibilities of the directors.
He, himself [the investor], chose the adviser who would do the managing,
selected the fund for its stated policy and the risk level apparent in its
portfolio .... By having made the choice, he divested himself of control of
his money and mandated the use of it in the hope of return through a fund
investment account. Until he elects to terminate the account through redemp-
tion, control of these operational aspects of the fund is in others than himself.
With that control go mandated functions and responsibilities, squarely within
his legitimate expectations."
Thus, the prospective investor by sifting through the prospectuses com-
mits a total act of decision to purchase or not to purchase any particular
fund's offering. Once having made his choice, he is in no position to com-
plain about any matter disclosed and accepted by him through the pros-
pectus. In this respect it is asserted that his selection reflects "an informed
act of mature will."'" In reality, however, he is merely culling blind bar-
gains.
II. DISCLOSURE OF INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES
Any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the disclosure of manage-
ment objectives and policies of a mutual fund through statutory analysis
or traditional modes of legal research seems grossly inadequate. Abstract
concepts are simply ineffective toward a meaningful evaluation of the
47 An analysis of the random sample selection of prospectuses in section II infra revealed that
only seven of the total forty-eight prospectuses received expressly stated that the fund's investment
objective and policies were "fundamental" and could only be changed by shareholder approval.
48 See note 69 infra.
4'Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258 (1961).




factors influencing the decision-making process of the investing public.
It may indeed be legally significant that a prospective investor through
"an informed act of mature will" accepts or rejects the terms of the trust
which guide mutual fund management in pursuit of their so-called fidu-
ciary obligations. However, the investor's selection of those terms which
generate the legal relationship rests upon a hypothesis of doubtful validity.
But no amount of functional analysis embodied in legalistic concepts can
ever attempt to show the terms upon which mutual fund shareholders en-
trust their economic power to the professional money-managers. Toward
this end the best laboratory is the investor's real world, and the best re-
search tool is the mutual fund prospectus.
An analysis of a random sample selection of mutual fund prospectuses"
revealed that, as required by the SEC,"5 the prospectuses are similarly
organized as to the manner in which the presentation is made to the inves-
tor. A short paragraph of description of "the fund" is followed by a
statement of its investment objective, investment policies, and a detailed
listing of investment restrictions. Thereafter, the prospectus discloses
information relating to officers and directors, the investment adviser, pur-
chase and redemption of shares, shareholders' rights and privileges, and
usually concludes with a list of investments owned, and certified financial
statements as of the end of the company's last fiscal year. The prospectuses
covered a broad range of the various types of funds, including income and
balanced funds along with several hedge funds. The prospectuses were
analyzed solely on the basis of investment objectives. In this regard, pri-
mary emphasis was placed on the so-called "growth" funds."
Over eighty per cent of the total prospectuses received listed the sole or
primary investment objective of the fund as one of capital growth or capi-
tal appreciation. 5 This percentage includes those funds whose objective
was stated to be either long-term growth or long-term appreciation. It can
probably be said with a fair degree of accuracy that a "growth" fund is
designed to realize gain through appreciation in the market value of its
portfolio investments, and, unlike an "income" fund, does not invest with
42A 10% random sample of all mutual funds registered as of June 30, 1969, was selected from
the INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Oct. 14, 1969, pt. II (Mutual Fund Directory). Those funds
in initial registration at June 30, 1969, were not included in the universe. In addition to the ran-
dom sample, all funds listed by the Digest as having in excess of 250,000 shareholders as of June
30, 1969, were also included in the analysis. The total sample included forty-seven listings and
inquiries produced prospectuses for forty-eight funds. This discrepancy resulted from receiving
several mutual fund prospectuses from a single issuer. For example, an inquiry to Keystone Funds,
Inc. produced four separate prospectuses, each representing a different Keystone series. In addition
to the forty-eight prospectuses received, three funds did not reply and two had ceased selling
shares to the public. While quarterly, semi-annual, or annual reports were received with the
prospectuses, no attempt was made to evaluate or analyze them.
5 5 See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 1932 (Dec. 15, 1953).
"No attempt was made to limit the random sample solely to "growth" funds. The prevalence
of this type of fund within the industry was of considerable significance.
a" This percentage includes capital growth funds listing "growth of future income" as an ob-
jective. This income growth objective, while considerably different from a current income objec-
tive, was considered indistinguishable from a pure "growth" purpose in view of the fact that
"growth" investments are justified on the basis of future growth of earnings. Shapiro, Trading in
Tulips, Barron's, Aug. 26, 1962, at 1, col. 1.
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a view toward the production of current dividend or interest income.
Whiile the objective of a growth fund is communicated to the investor with
some degree of clarity, little or no information is offered as to how it is to
be accomplished. A "growth" objective does not disclose the type of
investments that will be employed by management to achieve that end. An
investor would probably expect investments to be made in securities that
management expects to appreciate in market value. However, a "growth"
security has a distinct meaning only in relation to the subjective interpreta-
tion of the investing public. Any definitive meaning given to a growth or
appreciation investment by professional money managers or market ana-
lysts can not be ascribed to the relatively unsophisticated investor." To the
small investor a growth fund can mean anything from a blue chip stock
fund to an investment company dealing solely in highly speculative securi-
ties. And in this context, the prefacing of the growth objective with a
"long-term" appendage does little to dissipate the shroud of indefiniteness,
as the tax-minded investor considers a six-month holding period quite
adequate to fulfill a "long-term" commitment. Of course, such an analysis
of a fund's single statement of investment objective may seem unwarranted
in that disclosure of an objective is not intended to communicate anything
more than the ultimate purpose for which the fund is investing. In this
sense the statement of objective achieves its design.
More important in the disclosure process are the fund's investment poli-
cies, for they more than anything else are intended to establish the terms
upon which the investor delivers his money to a scheme of professional
management. However, unlike the fund's statement of objective, the in-
vestment policies do not seem to serve their purpose.
Of the thirty-nine prospectuses having a growth objective as defined
above, four stated that management's investment policy would be guided
not with a view toward speculation, but with due regard toward conser-
vation or safety of principal. Of the remaining thirty-five, nine pros-
pectuses made an affirmative statement to the effect that an investment in
that particular fund might entail risks greater than an investment in a fund
not having a growth objective. Two of these nine were hedge funds in
which investments were clearly labeled "speculative." The remaining seven
were strikingly similar to the other growth funds in both objectives and
policies, and nothing was discernible as to what prompted these seven
growth funds to mention the greater degree of risk when the great majority
of their cohorts omitted such a statement.
" The Investment Company Institute would agree with this definition except it characterizes
"growth" as being over a long term. Note, The Regulation of Dual Funds, 54 VA. L. REv. 1396,
1397 n.5 (1968). As to the implication of the meaning of "long term," see text following note
57 infra.
" The SPECIAL STUDY found a generally low level of knowledge among most mutual fund in-
vestors concerning their funds. It reported that it was quite clear that most mutual fund investors
did not possess the ability to deal with relevant investment issues, and it characterized the investors
as generally "unsophisticated." Id. pt. 4, at 145, 348.
" Almost all of the prospectuses contained a statement to the effect that the fund's objective
might not be attained because of the inherent risk in any investment. While the phraseology of
the investment objectives, policies, and restrictions of the growth funds' prospectuses were strik-
ingly similar, the prospectus writers experienced a total lapse of creativity when it came to wording
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The remaining twenty-six growth funds comprise more than fifty-five
per cent of all mutual fund prospectuses received. Each of these funds
stated in general terms that management's policy would be to invest in
securities that in management's view would be likely to achieve the growth
objective. In addition, all stated that investments would be primarily in
common stocks, and all but six listed preferred stocks and bonds as addi-
tional permissible investments." All but two of these twenty-six growth
funds either failed to give a definite portfolio turnover rate, or provided
an anticipated rate along with a qualification that it would be affected by
economic or market conditions in situations where management was invest-
ing or reinvesting in the best interests of the stockholders. The obvious
intent was to avoid restricting the fund to a portfolio turnover rate.
Almost all of the funds listed their portfolio turnover rates for the three
fiscal years immediately preceding the date of the prospectus. In the great
majority of the twenty-six growth funds the last fiscal year reported was
1968. The portfolio turnover rates for this year ranged from a low of
9.6 per cent to a high of 231 per cent, and over one-half of these funds
had turnover rates for the 1968 fiscal year in excess of 50 per cent." What
these rates are intended to demonstrate is entirely unclear. Excessive rates
point to a substantial amount of short-term trading which in turn may be
indicative of speculation. However, a 50 per cent rate (or any rate for
that matter) does not necessarily denote an absence of churning of securi-
ties, for such a rate could result if three-fourths of the fund's portfolio
remained stable and one-fourth was replaced twice during the year. In this
context, all but three of these twenty-six growth funds either stated that
the fund would engage in short-term trading, or, though not the intention
of the fund to engage in such trading, the right to do so was expressly
reserved in circumstances in which management deemed short-term trading
advisable.
The remainder of the investment policies of the prospectuses varied, but
in general such policies dealt with matters concerning the permissible
percentages of diversification in any one industry, factors to be considered
these disclaimer clauses. Such phrasing as, "of course, there is no assurance that the Fund's objec-
tive can be achieved since all investments are subject to risk," or some minor variation thereof was
rampant. In addition, what little value these disclaimer clauses contained was usually eradicated by
prefatory or conclusory remarks concerning the advantages of diversification of investments or the
full-time dedication of management to the attainment of the fund's objective.
as Those that omitted any reference to preferred stocks and bonds usually did not surrender
anything, as management reserved the right to assume a "defensive" position when required by
economic circumstances.
"°A number of the funds stated that the portfolio turnover rate for that particular fund may
be higher than a rate experienced by a fund having similar investment objectives. This appears to
be a direct consequence of Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (Ch. 1961). There a
mutual fund had a portfolio turnover rate of 44% for 1957, 97% for 1958, and 47.4% for 1959.
The average turnover for various funds for the same three years was 25%. In its prospectus the
fund stated that its investment policy was one of "capital growth" and "normal turnover." The
court held the excessive turnover for the three years 1957-59 was contrary to the stated invest-
ment policy of the fund because "[t]he 'normal turnover,' in its context, fairly implied a com-
parison with mutual funds generally and not with some isolated Fund also having a high turn-
over." Id. at 393.
"The portfolio turnover rate over the past ten years for the mutual fund industry has been




by management in choosing growth stocks, and in some instances the
fund's policy with respect to investment in restricted securities. The invest-
ment restrictions of all the prospectuses follow the pattern laid down by
the 1940 Act."' In only one instance did the funds show any initiative to
deviate from the statutory pattern. Of the twenty-six growth funds ana-
lyzed above, nine restricted permissible investments to securities of com-
panies which had been in continued operation for more than three years
at the time the investment was made. This statement alone can not be
considered a disclosure of management's intent not to invest in speculative
securities. The restriction would not be violated if the fund invested in
speculative issues of companies having at least a three-year history of con-
tinuous operation. High risk investments are not limited to new-born
firms." Concerning this restriction, ten funds made the limitation appli-
cable only if the investment would exceed three or five per cent of the
fund's total net assets, and eight of the prospectuses contained no such
restriction.
Other information that could possibly be useful to the investor in dis-
covering the fund's policies is the list of investments that the fund holds as
of the date of its certified financial statements. Concerning these invest-
ments, one commentator has remarked: "While many funds may state
their investment objectives in similar language, the actual degree of risk
taken to achieve the objective may vary considerably and be discernible
only by inspection of the portfolio--i.e., the nature of the stocks held and
the relative amount of cash or cash equivalents or bonds retained in the
portfolio.""4 This suggestion that the listing of securities and the relative
defensive position will inform the investor of management policies or the
degree of risk not otherwise disclosed is utterly preposterous. First, the
suggestion does not consider the possibility of the fund's "window-dress-
ing" its portfolio at the end of the fiscal year, or before each quarterly
report. Secondly, the mutual fund shareholder is a relatively unsophisti-
cated investor.6 It can not be expected that he will be familiar with any
more than a few of the companies in such a listing, and it can not be
seriously contended that he has the duty to familiarize himself with those
unknowns by delving into the issuer's history. If such were the case, the
investor would be performing the very tasks that he legitimately expects
professional management to undertake, and to that end be economically
rewarded at his expense. Finally, it is indeed a unique form of disclosure
which requires investors to glean hidden management policies and degrees
of risk from complex detailed comparisons of various listings of mutual
fund investments or non-investments.
Generally, the over-all investment objectives and policies of the twenty-
62 See notes 18 & 19 supra, and accompanying text.
' See Shapiro, Trading in Tulips, Barron's, Aug. 26, 1968, at 1, col. 1, where the author de-
tails five examples of the speculative "growth" stocks. In all five cases the companies had been in
continuous operation for at least three years.
'Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258, 1268 n.38
(1961).
6 See note 57 supra.
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six growth funds analyzed represent a composite of vague generalities com-
municating virtually nothing of any value to aid the investor in his
decision-making process. A prospective shareholder would be hard-pressed
to discover the kind of securities a fund's management would purportedly
invest in given a growth fund with a policy of diversification among and
concentration within equity securities, no definite statement as to portfolio
turnover or short-term trading, no emphasis placed on conservation of
capital or prudent investment, no statement whatever as to the type or de-
gree of risk involved in that particular fund,6 and in some cases a limited
investment restriction pertaining to issues of companies with less than
three years of continuous operation. It is quite obvious that mutual fund
management is not going to tie its hands with respect to the fund's invest-
ment policies. Nor, perhaps, should it do so. It has been quite persuasively
argued that the 1940 Act intended no such restrictions. 7 Neither should
any be attempted by further regulation, for if any benefit is to be derived
by the investing public from the advantages professional management
can offer, it would destroy a great deal of the mutual fund's attractive-
ness to circumscribe such benefits through regulation.66
Acceptance of this argument, however, demonstrates even more force-
fully the conclusion to which the growth funds concertedly aim. As to
management policies concerning investment decisions, the investor in no
way establishes, except within broad generalities, the "terms of the trust"
from which professional management derives its duties and obligations.
The prospectus grants mutual fund management broad discretionary power
in the exercise of its responsibilities, and the price of such discretion should
not be nominal. When a growth fund management speculates with other
people's money, the investor, never having consented to such action, should
not be precluded from challenging management with "gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust."
III. GROSS MISCONDUCT AND GRoss ABUSE OF TRUST: THE PAST
The Securities and Exchange Commission has the power under section
3 6 of the Act to initiate proceedings for the temporary or permanent re-
moval of an investment company's management for "gross misconduct or
66Better articulation of the fund's degree of risk would substantially aid the investor. One
fund announced: "The Fund is designed primarily for persons who can afford to assume a signifi-
cant degree of risk." Prospectus, Drexel Hedge Fund, Inc., May 16, 1969, at 1. Better yet, were
those funds that characterize the degree of risk in comparative terms. "The Fund's policy . . .
means that the assets of the Fund will generally be subject to greater potential fluctuation and
risk than would be involved if the Fund did not follow such a policy." Prospectus, Incentive
Fund, Inc., Jan. 5, 1970, at 5. "Such a policy . . . involves . . . the assumption of a higher
degree of risk than in a 'balanced' fund, or in a 'managed' fund .... " Prospectus, Loomis-Sales
Capital Development Fund, Inc., May 1, 1969, at 3.
It seems that these "comparative risk" statements would be more suitable for purposes of dis-
closure, and the SEC under its administrative authority would have little difficulty in requiring
such statements to be included in a fund's prospectus. See §§ 8(b) (4) & 38(a) of the 1940 Act.
67 Motley, Jackson, & Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63
HARy. L. REV. 1134, 1141, 1156 (1950); Thomas, supra note 36, at 928; Note, The Investment
Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L.J. 440, 456-57 (1941).
66 For example, mutual fund management needs some flexibility in order to shift strategies with
the market.
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gross abuse of trust."'" That this section confers a private right of action
against such management seems so well established as to be beyond ques-
tion."0 However, the present enigma for both courts and commentators
alike has been their inability to develop a definitive statement of these
elusive concepts. Standing alone, the phrases would seem to import a rather
low level of care and fiduciary obligation akin to the concepts of gross
negligence or bad faith. Fortunately for the investor, delineation of the
boundaries of management's duties has not been limited to so cursory an
examination.
Legislative History. The imposition of fiduciary responsibilities on invest-
ment company management was considered an integral part of the regula-
tory structure of the Act. The industry itself recognized the need for such
responsibilities,"' but it balked at the original proposal. Section 17 (e) of the
Wagner-Lea Bill provided: "Any gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust
in respect of a registered investment company, on the part of any person
registered under section 9 as an affiliated person of or principal underwriter
for such company, shall be unlawful."" The Commission's objective was
obviously to impose fiduciary responsibility upon investment company
management, and make it a criminal offense to violate that responsibility.
Representatives of the industry, however, wanted no part of a federal penal
offense which they contended was too "indefinite," and "indefinable."'"
"' Section 36 provides in full:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of
the United States or United States court of any Territory or other place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a person serving or acting in one
or more of the following capacities has been guilty, after the enactment of this title
and within five years of the commencement of the action, of gross misconduct or
gross abuse of trust in respect of any registered investment company for which such
person so serves or acts:
(1) as officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser, or de-
positor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end company,
unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If the Commission's allegations of such gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust are
established, the court shall enjoin such person from acting in such capacity or ca-
pacities either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall
deem appropriate.7 0 Just a few years ago the existence of a private right of action under the 1940 Act was
seriously questioned in Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as
moot per curiam, 369 U.S. 424 (1962). However, the Eighth Circuit in Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967), overruled Brouk by implication. See notes 92-93 infra,
and accompanying text. For cases supporting the private right of action, see Schwartz v. Eaton,
264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959); Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brown v. Bul-
lock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Taussig v. Wellington
Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960); Cogan v. Johnston, 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). For an argument establishing the propriety of an implied right of action under the Act
by means of analogous decisions in the related areas of securities regulation, see Brown v. Bullock,
194 F. Supp. 207, 224-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation-New
Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 73 (1962).
71 Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 266, 267 (1959).
72S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 17(e) (1940), as cited in Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp.
207, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
" Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 380, 1056 (1940), as cited in Greene, note 71 supra, at 270 n.13. Mr. Alfred
Jaretzki, Jr., representing the closed-end investment companies at the 1940 Hearings, stated to the
House committee:
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When viewed with hindsight, their objections certainly seem justified in
light of the judicial uncertainty as to the meaning of "gross abuse of
trust." During the Senate hearings on the original bill, David Schenker,
Chief Counsel to the SEC Investment Trust Study, 4 articulated the Com-
mission's position that the "trust" provision was not by any means intended
to impose upon investment company directors "a trustee obligation," pri-
marily because trustees "in some instances may be liable for negligence."" s
Thus, the SEC clearly never advocated that investment company manage-
ment should be held to the strict liability of a trustee. However, Mr.
Schenker's testimony on the original bill makes it equally clear that the
Commission was advocating a relatively broad standard of conduct con-
cerning the duties of management. '
The ultimate provisions of section 36, like so many other portions of
the compromise Act, were the result of a redrafting by the SEC and the
industry representatives." The only definite intent to emerge from the
legislative history indicates that the "trust" provision does not mean the
strict liability of a trustee. The "gross misconduct" provision apparently
did not receive even the limited attention given to the "trust" provision,
and no affirmative statement of either seems to have been attempted by the
SEC, the industry, or the legislators. Of course, the alterations made in the
compromise provision could support an argument that "gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust" was intended to apply a stricter standard than that
which was encompassed in the original proposal. In this context a criminal
offense for breaching these duties obviously focused primarily on the more
serious violations, and deletion of the criminal element operated to broaden
the applicable standards. However, it is more likely that the framers of the
Act were reluctant to delimit the substantive boundaries of management's
obligation, preferring to leave this task to the more suited and easily adapt-
able judiciary, whose common everyday business abounds in statutory
interpretation.
Judicial Activity. In Aldred Investment Trust v. SEC," the first case
The original bill contained a provision making unlawful gross misconduct and gross
abuse of trust on the part of officers and directors of investment companies and con-
sequently making such conduct subject to the penalties of the act. The group that
I represent objected to this provision on the ground that it subjected persons to
criminal liability for violation of an indefinite standard which was impossible of
determination.
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign CoM.
merce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 124 (1940), as cited in Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Jaretzki, supra note 36, at 344.
74 See note 16 supra.
7" Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 262 (1940), as cited in Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. at 241.
76 Id.
17 The House committee did, however, make clear the character of the final legislation. "In
the opinion of the Committee, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the industry itself,
this legislation is needed to protect small investors from breaches of trust upon the part of un-
scrupulous managements and to provide such investors with a regulated institution for the in-
vestment of their savings." H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1940); See S. REP.
No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11-12 (1940).
78 See note 75 supra.
79 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
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brought under section 36, the court of appeals gave a very broad interpre-
tation to "gross abuse of trust" in affirming a district court's determination
that section 36 had been violated by all but one of the individual defendant
trustees. The trust was registered under the Act as a closed-end, non-
diversified management investment company. The principle abuse was the
trust's purchase of the controlling interest in Suffolk Downs race track.
The investment constituted thirty per cent of the trust's assets, and was
made at a time when the trust could not pay interest on $5,900,000 of
debentures outstanding in the hands of public investors, and the assets of
the trust were substantially below this amount. Because the track invest-
ment of thirty per cent of the trust's assets involved a departure from the
company's investment policy, approval of a new policy was obtained at a
shareholders' meeting without any discussion of the track investment.
Inquiries by the bondholders were circumvented by the trustees in the hope
that profits from the upcoming racing season would satisfy the investors
and mollify any complainants. First, the court of appeals noted that, "[ b ] y
reason of its essential character of liquidity the investment company is
peculiarly subject to abuse .... 1 (b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 80a-1 (b),
in effect codifies the fiduciary obligations placed upon officers and directors
of investment companies."" In affirming the district court's finding that the
principal stockholder and his associates were guilty of a gross abuse of
trust, the court stated:
The findings of the District Court, amply supported by the evidence,
reveal a course of conduct that was motivated by self-interest and personal
advantage and the calculated denial of fiduciary obligations .... In effect the
appellants have been using their control of other people's money to enrich
themselves through the perquisites of such control. In our opinion the court
below properly found them guilty of 'gross abuse of trust' within the meaning
of § 3 6 of the Act.8"
The court's view that section 1 (b) codifies fiduciary obligations of the
officers and directors, and its reliance on the classic language of Mr. Justice
Douglas in Pepper v. Litton," manifests a conclusion that section 36 covers
a broad range of fiduciary obligation. The court in Aldred did not offer
a substantive statement of the actual standard to be imposed under section
36. Its observance that investment companies were "peculiarly subject to
abuse," might suggest a standard somewhat similar in scope to that im-
80 ld. at 260. The court quoted portions of § 1(b) in order to list several of these obligations.
See note 3 5 supra.
81151 F.2d at 260.
82 308 U.S. 295 (1939). The court cited the following statement of Mr. Justice Douglas:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his cestuis
second . . . . He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment
of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may
be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that
power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised
for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or
detriment of the cestuis. Where there is a violation of those principles, equity will
undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its consummation.
151 F.2d at 260.
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posed on the management of other financial institutions. No matter what
the ultimate standard the court in Aldred thought applicable, its interpre-
tation of section 36 gave impetus to a federal common law for investment
companies.
In Brown v. Bullock8 a court of appeals upheld a district court's finding
that a private right of action was available to a shareholder of an invest-
ment company under sections 15 and 37 of the Act. Although the court of
appeals did not comment on the alleged violation of section 36, the district
court's opinion 4 dealt quite extensively with this section and, therefore, is
particularly illuminating. The complaint in Brown alleged that the man-
agement company's advisory fees were excessive; that the advisory con-
tracts were not the result of arms-length bargaining, but rather were
adopted by management in arbitrary action replete with collusion and
gross negligence; and that the advisory fees, were not proportionate to the
value of the services performed, and the defendant directors knew or
should have known this fact. The district court found section 36 to be a
"reservoir" of substantive federal duties, and it enunciated the view, im-
plicit in Aldred, that the section was designed to create a federal common
law applicable to investment company management. A detailed investiga-
tion of the legislative history of section 36 led the court to make the
following observation:
It was not practicable to incorporate specific deterrents for every potential
abuse without seriously impeding the operation of the industry. Therefore,
with respect to the more subtle abuses-such as those that might arise from a
director's representation of conflicting interests or from his lack of indepen-
dence resulting in the subordination of the stockholders' interest to that of
the management-section 36 was a reservoir of fiduciary obligations imposed
upon affiliated persons to prevent gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust not
otherwise specifically dealt with in the Act."3
The court firmly rejected an argument that section 36 was incorporated
simply for the purpose of enforcing state-created duties, and it emphasized
that to deny the existence of a federal duty would clearly frustrate the
intent of Congress. In the end the court viewed section 36 as a residuary
clause capable of dealing with abuses not readily foreseeable by the framers
and hence not specifically enumerated in the Act. In the court's opinion,
"the judicial implementation of the provisions for truly independent di-
rectors and for remedies against gross misconduct and gross abuse of trust
are critically necessary to prevent a recurrence of the evils and malpractices
that victimized the investing public prior to the passage of the Act.""
The decisions in Aldred and Brown represent cornerstones in this under-
developed area of federal common law. However, it is relatively little com-
fort to investors merely to have established that section 36 of the Act
83294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
84 
Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"id. at 238-39 n.1.
'lid. at 240 n.1.
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creates certain fiduciary obligations which can be privately enforced by the
federal judiciary. It is much more important to question the relative
standard of such obligations. In answering this the courts have been less ar-
ticulate and oftentimes quite confused. In both Aldred and Brown there
were implications to the effect that the standard may be similar to that im-
posed by corporate law on commercial and savings banks." This proposition
has been forcefully endorsed by several commentors, ss but not by any other
courts.
In SEC v. Midwest Technical Development Corp." the Commission
charged that the directors were "trafficking" in fund portfolio securities in
violation of section 17 of the Act (prohibiting transactions of certain
affiliated persons and underwriters). The Commission also asserted a vio-
lation of section 36. The court found a violation of section 17(d), but
declined to apply section 36, stating that, "[a]n adjudication of gross abuse
of trust must be based upon evidence that a director is so untrustworthy
that he should not be permitted to act in that capacity for any other com-
pany."9 While the court found certain patterns and practices to the de-
fendants' dealing in portfolio stocks, the failure of the defendant directors
to appreciate the conflict of interest and their unintentional failure to ob-
tain Commission approval were mere technicalities not justifying the
application of such drastic measures as section 36. The court in Midwest
may have believed that the standard under section 36 should vary depend-
ing upon whether the SEC or a stockholder is alleging a violation of a
"gross abuse of trust." It is clear that the SEC's remedy is the removal of
the director,"1 but it is as equally unclear as to what a shareholder may
recover. In any event, the court in Midwest does not expressly enunciate
this principle, and its application under section 36 seems questionable.
In Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc." shareholders of the Fund sought to
hold directors of the Fund liable for a breach of duty owed them under
various provisions of the Act. The practices contended to be in violation
of such duties included excessive trading in portfolio securities, and general
management of the Fund in the interest of the controlling group at the
expense of the shareholders' interest. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the
complaint on the basis that the 1940 Act did not create duties owed by the
directors which were enforceable by a federal court in a private right of
action. In dictum the court stated that the controlling corporate law re-
quired that directors only exercise due care, and they are not liable as
insurers. Because the stockholders sought to hold the directors to the strict
" As to Aldred, see note 80 supra, and accompanying text. In Brown the court stated:
"Section 36 imposes upon investment company directors, officers, investment advisers and principal
underwriters fiduciary obligations appropriate to their respective trustee and managerial responsi-
bilities in the handling of other people's money." 194 F. Supp. at 238 n.1.
" Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Re-
sponsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 181, 203 (1966);
The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 940 (1969).
s
5 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91252 (D. Minn. 1963).
"Id. at 94146.
91 See note 69 supra.
92286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot per curiam, 369 U.S. 424 (1962).
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liability of an insurer, the court found they had violated no duty. The
decision in Browuk concerning the private right of action has been impliedly
overruled in the Eighth Circuit."' However, the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of private civil remedies under federal regulatory statutes"4 does not
imply that Brouk- is wrong by tying itself to corporate law as an appro-
priate source of director's liability in investment companies. The Eighth
Circuit will re-evaluate the Brouk dictum when the question is more fully
considered in a private right of action. However, the decision stands as an
indication of a court's first impulse to look to corporate common law as the
appropriate source for the derivation of directorial liability under section
3 6 of the Act. While this approach is probably favored by the industry,"5 it
has been severely criticized as being too restrictive of the fiduciary obliga-
tions of investment company management."
Acampora v. Birklan?" illustrates succinctly the ultimate confusion
which has entered the area. A shareholder sought recovery of certain man-
agement fees paid during a period when the management advisory contract
was contended to be void. The court allowed recovery for a limited amount
of fees. Even though a violation of section 36 was not alleged, the court
on its own initiative offered some thoughts on directors' liability. "[L ] ack
of prudence on the part of the directors would not subject them to lia-
bility .... Admittedly, the standard is that of gross negligence or ... bad
faith." However, in the same breath the court says: "These non-affiliated
directors have a demanding mission and that is the protection of the assets
of Fund and the shareholders. Their position in relation to the adviser is
adversary in character, and if they are, to properly fulfill their mission they
are obligated to scrutinize the acts and doings of the adviser with great
care."" The concepts of "gross negligence" and "great care" seem highly
incompatible. But the court in Acampora, in touching upon the duties of
the non-affiliated directors, may have struck a chord that has thus far
remained silent in the judicial interpretation of section 3 6.
Not only have judicial authorities given various interpretations to section
36, but in general they have failed to distinguish between a duty of care
and a duty arising from a conflict of interest. Within the structural frame-
work of the mutual fund organization, it would seem that the independent
directors would be more vulnerable to an alleged violation of the duty of
care, and that the affiliated directors and management adviser would be
"Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
SJaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 777 (1964).
"Comment, Rights and Obligations in the Mutual Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VAND. L.
REV. 1120 (1967).
'7220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
98 id. at 550.
" Id. The distinction between non-affiliated (or independent) and affiliated directors can be
found in § 10(a) which provides: "[N]o registered investment company shall have a board of
directors more than 60 per centum of the members of which are persons who are investment ad-




more susceptible to the conflict of interest attack."° While it is recognized
that in any given factual situation violations of both duties may arise, the
distinction between affiliated and non-affiliated directors is intended to em-
phasize the separability that has been attributed to the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty.1"' While the two fields seem to overlap in certain instances,
it has generally been recognized that they proceed from entirely different
principles. In this context, the framers of the 1940 Act may have recog-
nized this diversity when they wrote into section 36 both a "misconduct"
and a "trust" provision, for the duty of care has not historically been con-
sidered a "fiduciary" obligation.' 'While this differentiation may have some
merit on its face, it is difficult to determine whether the courts have paid
tribute to it.' In any event, it is not intended to explore the applicable
standard in relation to the conflict of interest problem. Observance of
investment policies resulting in a fund's entry into speculation under cir-
cumstances where the fund has not disclosed to the investor the amount of
risk or the fund's intention to so speculate could, of course, create serious
conflicts of interest arising from greater management fees or higher broker-
age costs. However, the present inquiry is limited to a search for the stan-
dard of care applicable to directors and management advisers, and whether
or not speculation with other people's money can be said to violate that
standard.
IV. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND SPECULATION
Several commentators have rather forcefully argued that the standard
applicable under "gross abuse of trust" should be similar to that applied to
commercial and savings banks."' The analogy is supported primarily by a
comparison between the nature of the institutions with respect to the type
of investments made, the persons they are designed to serve, and the high
liquidity of their assets. Further, it is argued that the special regulatory
statutes under which the national and state savings institutions operate,
show governmental concern for the adequate protection of an investing
public which is financially unsophisticated. 1' For the mutual fund share-
holder, it is alleged that this governmental concern is demonstrated in
section 36 and the general declarations of policy in section 1 of the Act.
The argument possesses a great deal of appeal, but it appears that its advo-
cates have discussed its application only under circumstances involving a
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and, more specifically only in con-
10 It should be remembered that § 36 applies not only to directors of investment companies,
but also to management advisers. See note 69 supra.
101H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 62, 66, at 156, 167 (1946).
102 id.
'03 In Brown the court speaks of "fiduciary obligations" encompassing both the "misconduct"
and the "trust" provisions of § 36. See note 85 supra, and accompanying text. Also, in Acampora
the court seems to embrace two completely different standards even though the decision is not
based specifically upon § 36. See notes 97-99 supra, and accompanying text.
" Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 88, at 189; The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44
NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 940 (1969). See also Comment, Rights and Obligations in the Mutual
Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VANO. L. REV. 1120 (1967).
"°Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 88, at 191-92.
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nection with management advisory fees. Within this limited context the
argument is given added impetus by the rising standard of directorial
loyalty over the past several decades,' and even more recently under the
federal securities acts."' However, since this increase is not generally appli-
cable to the duty of care, and because the banking analogy, though rele-
vant, has not been specifically applied to this duty, it seems that a basic
analysis is required to formulate a possible standard. Before undertaking
this task it must be emphasized that, for the provisions of section 36 to
apply, something more than simple misconduct or abuse of trust is required.
In the words of one authority, characterizing only the "trust" provision,
the standard under section 36 is limited as follows: "Although it is clear
that directors are held to account for negligence, the phrase "gross abuse of
trust" clearly indicates that the standard was not meant to include inadver-
tent conduct or minor lapses; the phrase conveys a meaning of serious, wil-
ful misconduct or disloyalty, recklessness, or gross negligence with respect
to an investment company."'08
The business judgment rule applicable generally to directors of corporate
entities proceeds from the obligation of corporate directors to perform their
various functions with due care and diligence.' 5 Courts are usually quite
reluctant to interfere with the correctness of directorial actions, and, hence,
directors are vested with a large degree of discretion concerning their
business transactions."0 However, the application of the business judgment
rule assumes the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, and therefore the
focus is on the duty of care."' The standard is usually formulated in terms
of that care and diligence which a reasonably prudent director would exer-
cise under similar circumstances."' From this general rule there has devel-
oped the principle that directors of banks, trust companies, and other insti-
tutions which engage in the handling and investment of other people's
money, are held to a higher standard of care than are directors of ordinary
business corporations. However, it is unlikely that the standards are really
any higher, but rather simply that the circumstances are extremely differ-
ent.1
3
It does seem appropriate that the banking analogy should have its place
in the derivation of the proper standard of care applicable to directors of
1"6 Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CAL. L. REV. 408 (1962).
°'0See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
'0' Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 88, at 226.
"9H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 62, at 156 (1946).
55Id. § 63a, at 160-61.
1' Id.
"'Id.; N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS § 10, at 242 (1959).
" Professor Ballantine states:
Directors of savings banks, trust companies, life insurance companies and companies
which solicit the handling and investment of the funds of others, are by some courts
declared responsible for a higher degree of wisdom, prudence and good judgment
than directors in ordinary business corporations. It is doubtful, however, whether
more is actually required than giving reasonable attention to the business, making
proper inquiries upon the matter in hand, and exercising an honest judgment upon
the information available, unless improvidence goes to the point of wilful or negli-
gent waste.
H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 63a, at 161 (1946) [footnotes omitted]. See, e.g., Litwin v.
Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940).
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the mutual funds. However, the internal operational similarities between
the two types of institutions should not create a higher standard of care
for the mutual fund director solely because, as is so often contended,
directors in the banking industry are declared responsible for a higher
degree of wisdom, prudence, and good judgment. By placing emphasis on
this higher standard alleged to exist within the banking industry and there-
by analogizing through similarity of circumstances to the operational
aspects of the mutual fund, the standard created for mutual fund directors
is inappropriately circumscribed because the reasoning process emphasizes
the standard itself and not the circumstances to which the general standard
should be applied. To equate a mutual fund to a bank or trust company
and thereby derive a standard applicable to mutual fund management ig-
nores the fundamental difference between the two institutions; a difference
which, because it is correctly a "circumstance," should engender a greater
burden on the mutual fund director.
As has been stressed earlier, the overwhelming attractiveness of the
mutual fund is the prominence it places on professional management.""
Unlike any other financial institution, it offers to the public only one
service-professional investment management. And the emphasis given to
this service by the industry has led the investor to elevate the concept to
the point where it fosters his highest expectations."' Because of its impor-
tance to both management and investor alike, the presence of professional-
ism should operate as the most important of "circumstances" encompassing
management's duty of care. Directorial responsibility in the growth mutual
fund should rest upon that care and diligence which a reasonably prudent
director would exercise in the professional handling and investment of
money given to the company for the purposes of obtaining growth of capi-
tal under the investment policies and restrictions which the investor has
consented to. However, assuming the existence of speculative practices
and equating the standard to be consistent with professionalism does not,
without more, establish directorial liability. There remains the problem of
the "prudent man."
Is investment in speculative securities the exercising of the care and
diligence of a reasonably prudent director under the circumstances set
forth above? Several professionals would have us think so,"" but not all
would agree."7 In order to evaluate more carefully the contrasting views,
a close look at the kind of investments that this professionalism fosters is
necessary. One Wall Street strategist with over twenty-five years experi-
ence in analyzing stocks recently compared the 1968 mania for growth
stocks to the 17th century tulip craze which swept Holland." ' The follow-
114 See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
" Although diversification of risk is also an important factor in the mutual fund industry, it
seems that even it can be considered merely a single facet of the concept of professionalism.
... See note 13 supra. See also The Money Men: You Call it Speculation; I Call it Investment,
FoRBEs, Sept. 1, 1969, at 56. During an interview with Fred Carr, manager of a "go-go" fund,
the interviewer concluded: "In fact, much that Carr says seems calculated to make speculation
sound respectable." Id. at 58.
11 See note 13 supra.
"8 Shapiro, Trading in Tulips, Barron's, Aug. 26, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
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ing illustrates one of the many growth stocks highly acclaimed by private
and institutional investors during the summer of 1968.
The common stock of National Patent Development Corp., selling at $185,
is another present-day tulip. On December 31, 1967, there were 730,882
shares outstanding. To this must be added 263,864 shares which have been
issued since December 31, 1967, or may be issued through exercise of warrants
and options. The grand total: 994,748 shares. This entire issue, at the current
market of $185 per share, is being given a value in excess of $175,000,000.
What does the tulip-buyer get for his $175,000,000? The chief asset of
National Patent is a licensing agreement it has received to produce or market
a plastic (hydrophylic acrylic) polymer. The licensing agreement was signed
with the Academy of Science of Czechoslovakia, which owns the patent.
The plastic substance, which has a property to absorb liquids, is deemed to
have commercial possibilities, particularly in contact lenses.
Bausch & Lomb has signed a sub-licensing agreement with National Patent
under which Bausch & Lomb will investigate, develop, manufacture and mar-
ket contact lenses on a 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement. The contract can
be terminated by Bausch & Lomb at any time with a minimal penalty pay-
ment. After months of investigation, no contact lenses have yet been market-
ed. National Patent has signed sub-licensing agreements with other companies
for other uses of Hydron (the name which National Patent has given to the
plastic material). So far, no sales of materials fabricated of Hydron have
been made in commercial quantities. The company has lost money every
year since its inception in 1959; the greatest loss, $758,193, was incurred
in 1967. The accumulated historical deficit is $1,762,333.
Speculators who put a $175,000,000 value on National Patent have been
mesmerized by the 'unusual' properties which Hydron is reputed to possess....
Individuals or institutions who have put their money into National Patent
should expect that some day the company might turn a profit. How large a
profit should be achieved in order to justify a market price of $185 per share?
Surely, it is not too much to ask for earnings which would establish a 17
price-earnings multiple, since it is possible to buy the world's greatest cor-
porations for just such a P-E. To attain such a multiple, National Patent De-
velopment would need to earn approximately $11,000,000, equal to $11 per
share ($11 multiplied by 17 would result in 187, or approximately the
present market price).
And what are the chances that National Patent will ever earn $11,000,000
in a single year? Bausch & Lomb, a leading maker of ophthalmic products
and scientific instruments, with a global organization, infinitely greater tech-
nological resources and far bigger assets, in 1967 recorded the largest income
in its history; yet earnings came to less than $6,000,000. In most of the years
during the past decade, its net ranged between $2,000,000 and $3,000,000.
Why these modest earnings? Because the markets which Bausch & Lomb
serves do not yield really great profits. The clear inference is that National
Patent can be expected, at best, to enjoy earnings which are only a fraction
of Bausch & Lomb's. To expect otherwise is to chase a tulip seller across the
streets of Amsterdam."'
The author notes that this kind of speculation has become very popular.
Whereas twenty-five years ago speculators were looked upon with suspicion,
today "as the number of such speculators has swelled and as their ranks
have been joined by mutual funds . ..and other sophisticated investors,
119 Id. at 3, col. 1.
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their behavior in the marketplace has been accepted and emulated."'' 0
This acceptance and emulation seems to be the core of the problem. The
underlying justification for the kind of investing exemplified above is
based on a change in the prudent-man standard. Thus, for professional
money-managers, the adoption of investment techniques once considered
speculative is justified as "reasonable" solely on the basis of mass accep-
tance. It is true that the standard of the reasonable man has for some time
been dependent upon the usual and ordinary conduct of others in the ap-
plicable community."' While the use of a community standard might
appear to create a rule based on the judgment of a majority of the com-
munity, it has never been considered the sole criterion in developing the
concept of the reasonable man. Authorities recognize that a deviation from
the ordinary will not of itself violate the reasonable-man standard."' How-
ever, in a confrontation between the old and the new, the law is inclined to
give preference to traditional custom. Even assuming that the entire invest-
ment community were to employ new investment techniques, such a
change would not encompass an alteration in the relevant standard. An
entire industry has been known to be unreasonable,"' and in this regard the
prevailing community standard is not always a reliable one. "What usually
is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be
done is fixed by a standard of prudence, whether it usually is complied
with or not.""..4 In the mutual fund industry the new standard is by no
means a universal one. Those in opposition to the modern investment ap-
proach point to the old school with its emphasis on conservation of princi-
pal and less drastic methods of investing for capital growth."' Under the
guise of professionalism the modern approach to the preservation of capital
is to double it,"6 without regard for the risk assumed.
It is reasonable to speak of new financial institutions and business cus-
toms, changing commercial methods and practices, altered monetary usages
and investment combinations. It is reasonable to speak of the relative values
of the things that can be found for sale in the financial world. And it is
reasonable to speak of the insufficiency of maintaining the value of invest-
ment capital over a long period of years without protecting the purchasing
power of the dollar. But is it reasonable that the economic and social cir-
cumstances which have tended to alter the American property system
should dictate the abandonment of a principle of cautious responsibility?
In light of the traditional standard of investing and the experiences of the
1920's, it would seem that the role of conservative investing has its place
in an industry that acclaims professionalism, and that the standard should
12o Id.
121W. PROSSER, TORTS § 33, at 168-70 (1964).
12 Id. at 171.
l"aThe T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v.
Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1933) (radio sets for tugs).
" Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903); accord, Wabash R.R. v. Mc-
Daniels, 107 U.S. 454 (1882).
"2 See, e.g., Bid, Investment Problems and Prospects, Corn. & Fin. Chr., June 12, 1969, at 1,
col. 1.
"6A. SMITH, THE MONEY GAME 180 (1969).
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not become so easily abrogated over a relatively short era of financial pros-
perity. The market itself has lectured the mutual funds once before on the
hazards of speculation.12 ' To forget that lecture is to invest in "irration-




The mutual fund industry perhaps more than any other institutional
investor demonstrates succinctly the burgeoning institutionalization of
private property ownership on the American economic scene. Aside from
the desirability of further institutionalization, the majority of problems
countenanced are the progeny of such growth, if only because their subtle
presence in 1940 escaped recognition by legislators bent on the eradication
of more prominent abuses. If this thirty-year-old legislation was designed
to cope with the thorns of speculation, a lack of precision in so doing can
only be attributed to the framers' utmost faith in the diligence of both
the federal and state judiciary and the SEC. Certainly, the explicit statu-
tory utterances of section 8 and the accompanying legislative history effec-
tuate a complete frustration of that diligence, even within the laudable
purposes and policies which gave birth to the Act. However, within the
present boundaries of section 36 there lies a seething potential for judicial
implementation. Contemplating the section as a skeleton of legal principles,
the judiciary can develop the broad policy of investor protection in much
the same spirit that has prompted judicial action under the federal securi-
ties acts.
However, even such a development of investor protection is only half an
answer. Certainly, better articulated investment objectives and policies are
the ultimate goal. But what of the realities of enforcement? Money damages
are an extremely high cost to pay for such benefits where multimillion dol-
lar losses are possible. For the future, the SEC can require disclosure of the
risk inherent in a mutual fund investment, and perhaps even disclosure of
gains and losses on a more frequent and specific basis. 2 ' But this is of no
help to the present investor. For him, section 36 provides the best means of
enforcement-the removal of professional management. While removal has
been considered a drastic measure,15° such severity may be in order. If the
declarations of policy in section 1 of the Act are to represent something
more than mere verbiage, then it seems only appropriate that the federal
judiciary should enlighten the professional investment community on the
congressional condemnation of selling an investing public a bill of goods
containing hidden charges for institutional speculation.
127 Comment, The Regulation of Management Investment Trusts for the Protection of Investors,
46 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214, 1225-26 (1937). See also Tolins, The Investment Company Act of
1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77, 81-82 (1940); Comment, Federal Legislation: Investment Company
Act of 1940, 29 GEo. L.J. 614 (1941); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLuM.
L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1941).
.2. Quotation is attributed to George Santayana, an American philosopher. Torrance, Legal
Background, Trends, and Recent Developments in the Investment of Trust Funds, 17 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 160 (1962).
.. See note 66 supra.
'30 See notes 90-91 supra, and accompanying text.
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